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ESTABLISHMENT OF BARGAINING RIGHTS 
WITHOUT AN NLRB ELECTION 
H award Lesnick* 
T
HOSE who have become accustomed to keep one ear cocked for 
the five-part harmony relentlessly gTotmd out by the mimeograph 
machines at NLRB headquarters on Pennsylvania Avenue-those 
whom one may call professional Board-watchers-have doubtless no­
ticed how fashions come and go in the subjects of NLRB litigation. 
It is as if the interest of litigants as easily wanes as does that of the 
reader of opinions, for there is a fairly regular succession of 
themes, each to be developed for a time until, as though by common 
consent, attention swings toward a different problem entirely. The 
wave of the present, I believe most would agree, is the question of 
establishment of bargaining rights without an election. The Board 
has entertained a strikingly increasing number of cases involving 
union attempts to secure representative status other than through 
success in a Labor Board election,1 and Congressmen,2 judges,3 com­
mentators4 and practitioners5 have each contributed to the medley 
of the "card check." Because the subject is currently so fashionable, 
I would like to forego the historical narrative ordinarily expected of 
professors and introduce the relevant legal issues with an overview 
of the current Board position, ·which in my view has changed per­
ceptibly during the past year. 
• Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1 952, New York University; 
A.M. 1953, LL.B. 1958, Columbia University.-Ecl. This paper is a revised and slightly 
expanded version of one delivered at the Institute on Labor Law of the Southwestern 
Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, in October, 1966, and published in the Proceedings 
of the Institute by Mathew Bender & Co. 
l .  There were, if my count is correct, about a dozen such cases in 196·1, twice 
that many the following year, and approximately 1 1 7 i n  1 955. 
2. Sec To Repeal Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, Hearings 
Befor·e the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, 89th Cong., 1 st Scss. 16-26, 1 8 1 ·93 ( 1 965); Ill CoNe. Rr.c. 19308 (daily ed. 
Aug. 4, 1955) (remarks of Senator Javits); id. at 1 5 1 24 (daily eel.  June 29, 1 965) 
(remarks of Senator Fannin). 
3.  The volume of l itigation has been substantial. The most vigorous a ttack on 
the Board's use of authorization cards is probably Judge Timbers', in his separate 
opinion in NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1 966). 
4. For a diatribe against reliance on authorization cards, see Comment, Union 
Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 ( 1 966); a more restrained criticism is Comment, 
Refusal-to-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA: Card Checks and 
Employee hee Choice, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 387 ( 1966). 
5. See, e.g., Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cm·ds in Determin ing 
Union Majority, !6 LAn. L.J. '134 (!955); Loomis, Determination of Union iHajority 
Status, 47 C111. IlAR RECORD ! 1 3 (! 955); Sandler, Another Worry for Employers, U.S. 
News & ·world Report, March 1 5, ! 965, p. 86; Shuman, Requiring a Unioll to Demon­
strate Its Majority Status by Means of an Election Becomes Riskier, 16 LAB. L.J. 426 
(!965) . 
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I. THE PRESENT STATE OF BoARD LAvv 
The central question is this : May an employer, presented with a 
demand to recognize a union which claims to have obtained signed 
authorization cards from a majority of his employees in an appro­
priate unit, decline to extend recognition and insist instead on a 
Labor Board election to determine the question of representation? 
Put another way, may a union denied recognition claimed on 
the basis of a showing o£ cards seek bargaining rights through either 
an election or an unfair labor practice charge, as it prefers, or may 
the employer confine it to the election route? I would have given a 
somewhat different answer a year ago, but today it seems clear (al­
though perhaps for today only) that an employer ordinarily may in­
sist on an election, that the initial option is his rather than the 
union's. The 1961 decision in Snow & Sons6 seemed to suggest a far 
narrower employer privilege. The Board there specifically rejected 
the notion that an employer could insist on an election "because the 
employees might change their minds," and came close to holding 
that a refusal to recognize can be justified only by a doubt of present 
majority which has some objective warrant. It said: 
The Board has held that the right of an employer to insist upon a 
Board-directed election is not absolute. \'\There, as here, the Employer 
entertains no reasonable doubt either with respect to the appropri­
ateness of the proposed unit or the Union's representative status, 
and seeks a Board-directed election without a valid ground therefor, 
he has failed to fulfill the bargaining requirements under the Act.7 
Today, Snow has been confined to its particular facts (the em­
ployer reneged on his agreement after verifying the cards), continued 
reliance on it has been explicitly disapproved by the Board,8 and it� 
principles have in effect been largely overruled. While continuing 
to talk the language of good-faith doubt, the Board has given that 
term a meaning substantially different from its earlier one of ar 
actual particularized skepticism regarding the Union's present rna 
jority. This recent withdrawal is most clearly manifested, and it: 
dimensions clarified, in the Strydel,9 Aaron Brothen10 and H. ir W 
6. 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962). 
7. Id. at 710-11. In enfoTcing the BoaTel order in Snow, the court of appeal 
seemed to agree that the test is an objective one: "The manner in which a1 
employer receives reliable information of union representation .. . is of no conse 
quence. Once he has received such information hom a reliable source, insistence up01 
a Board election can no longer be defended on the ground of a genuine doubt as t• 
majority Tepresentation. " 308 F.2d 687, 692 ('lth Cir. 1962). 
8. See Strydcl , Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 61 L.R.R. M. 1230 (Feb. I, 1966); Furr'� 
Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 61 L.R.R.M. 1388 (Mar. 7, 1966). 
9. Supra note 8. 
10. Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108. 62 L.R.R. l\1. 1160 (May 25, 1966). 
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Constmction11 decisions. In Strydel, the Board expressly declared 
its unwillingness to infer "that Respondent was guilty of bad faith 
merely because it denied recognition while rejecting the union's 
proposal for submission of the cards to impartial determination. This 
does not, standing alone, provide an independent basis for conclud­
ing that the instant denial of recognition was unlawful."12 Aaron 
Brothe-rs provided a somewhat more illuminating explanation: 
An election by secret ballot is normally a more satisfactory means of 
determining employees' wishes, although authorization cards signed 
by a rna jority may also evidence their desires. Absent an affirmative 
showing of bad faith, an employer, presented with a majority card 
showing and a bargaining request, will not be held to have violated 
his bargaining obligation under the law simply because he refuses 
to rely upon cards, rather than an election, as the method for deter­
mining the union's majority.13 
Although these views seem to suggest-as Member Jenkins aptly put 
it in his concurring opinion in Aaron Brothers-"that the mere ab­
sence of a good-faith doubt of the majority, an unsupported expres­
sion of doubt, or a 'no opinion' attitude tmvard its existence, does 
not require the employer to accept the cards as proof of [the ma­
jority],"11 the Board has stopped short of acknowledging a general 
employer right (assuming no accompanying unlawful acts) to refuse 
recognition demanded on the basis of cards. In H. <if W. Construc­
t ion C 0.1 the employer withheld recognition on the ground, later 
held erroneous, that the NLRB lacked jurisdiction over it. Because 
the employer did not insist that the union test its majority through 
an election and did not (except post litem motam) question the 
union's representative status, a majority of the Board found an un­
lawful refusal to recognize. The opinion explicitly recognized an em­
ployer privilege to rely on an asserted doubt of majority, "though his 
doubt is founded on no more than a distrust of cards. "  Contrary im­
plications of Snow notwithstanding, he "will not be subject to an S(a) 
(5) violation simply because he is unable to substantiate a reasonable 
basis for his doubt."15 However, the Board adhered to the view that 
an employer who in fact lacks-that is, is proven to lack-an actual 
doubt of present majority may not lawfully refuse recognition sought 
on the basis of a proffer of cards. In effect, then, an employer pres­
ently has the right to insist on an election, but only if he does so on 
11. H. & W. Constr. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (63 L.R.R.M.) 1346 
(l\ov. 10, 1966). 
12. 61 L.R.R.M. at 1231. 
13. 62 L.R.R.M. at 1161. 
J.1 . Id. at 1162. 
15. 63 L.R.R.M. at 1348·'!9. 
854 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:851 
the ground that he disbelieves the union's card showing and 
his assertion of disbelief is not itself belied by his other acts or state­
ments. The need to resolve any latent inconsistency between the 
acknowledgment of a privilege to rely on a generalized "distrust of 
cards" and the denial of an opportunity to see if the employees 
"might change their minds" has not yet been given recognition in 
NLRB opinions. 
It is not the typical case, however, when the employer simply 
declines recognition. In most of the litigated cases, the employer has 
undertaken to campaign actively against the union. A union ·which 
has filed or is planning to file an election petition and which is faced 
with acts of employer coercion, discrimination, or interference dur­
ing the pre-election period may abandon the election campaign and 
file charges challenging the lawfulness of the initial Tefusal to recog­
nize (as well as the employer's pre-election conduct). The union may 
prefeT, howeveT, to continue to an election in the hope of prevailing 
despite employer coercion, and to attack (should that hope prove 
unfounded) the validity of the election and the lawfulness of the 
original refusal to recognize in consolidated post-election proceed­
ings.16 Whether arising after an election loss or following a campaign 
aborted by unfair labor practices charges, the employer violations 
have served, in the overwhelming majority of cases, as the founda­
tion for a finding of bad faith, rendering the initial Tefusal to recog­
nize unlawful and calling forth a bargaining order as the standard 
remedy for a refusal to bargain. As the Board summaTizecl its prac­
tice in Aaron Brothers: 
INhere a company has engaged in substantial unfair labor practices 
calculated to dissipate union support, the Board, with the Courts' 
approval, has concluded that employer insistence on an election was 
not motivated by a good-faith doubt of the union's majority, but 
rather by a rejection of the collective-bargaining principle or by a 
desire to gain time within which to undermine the union.l' 
Here too it seems that there has been a recent change in ra­
tionale. ·while the Board, as the preceding quotation acknowledges, 
has regularly used employer acts of coercion to infeT a lack of earlier 
16. This option arises from the overruling of the Aiello Dairy Fanns doctrine, 
(requiring election of remedies), 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954), by the well-known decision 
in Berne! Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). The § 8(a)(5) charge may go 
forward only if a motion to set aside the election is properly made and is found 
meritorious. Irving Air Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627, 630 (1964); Kolpin Bros., 149 
N.L.R.B. 1378 (1964). 
17. 62 L.R.R.i.\L at 1161 ; cf. Jem Mfg., Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 61 L.R.R.M. 
1074 (1966): "Ordinarily the General Counsel wstains this b u rden of proof [of bad 
faith] by demonstrating that an employer has engaged in other u n fair labor practices 
which are designed to dissipate a union's m ajOTity status." 
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doubt regarding the union's majority, it seems fairly clear that such 
a circumstantial inference cannot logically be made as confidently or 
routinely as it has been. The fact of employer coercion may be as 
consistent with a desire to prevent the acquisition of majority status 
as with a purpose to destroy an existing majority. Judge Learned 
Hand aptly put the thought:  "As a penalty it might be proper, but 
as a link in reasoning it seems to us immaterial."18 Indeed, critics, 
noting the weakness of the link in reasoning, have concluded that 
what is involved in fact is a penalty and that it is not proper as 
such.19 Recent decisions seem to me to have emphasized (perhaps in 
partial recognition of such views) a significantly different rationale. 
In Aaron B-rothers, as a footnote to the passage quoted above, the 
Board referred to its 
objective of utilizing the most reliable means available to ascertain 
the true desires of employees with respect to the selection of a col­
lective-bargaining representative. Where an employer has engaged in 
unfair labor practices, the results of a Board-conducted election are 
a less reliable indication of the true desires of employees than au­
thorization cards, whereas, in a situation free of such unlawful inter­
ference, the converse is true.�o 
The Board comes very close here to acknowledging that the signifi­
cance of unfair labor practices l ies less in their retroactive impact on 
the substantive lawfulness of the insistence on an election than in 
their effect on the appropriate remedy when an election has been 
set aside or aborted. Indeed, there have been several cases in which 
a union proving prior majority status has won a bargaining order 
although there was no finding of a refusal to bargain (because, for 
example, no demand for recognition had been made). Here it is 
plain that the bargaining requirement is a remedy for employer co­
ercion. But more of these problems in a moment. 
Finally, there is the question of proof of actual majority status 
in the unfair labor practice proceeding. Here perhaps the greatest 
heat has been generated. The Board has shown a consistent reluc­
tance to entertain broad attacks on the validity of authorization 
cards and has permitted chal lenges only to individual cards under 
rules which make it difficult for these challenges to succeed. The 
most litigated i llustration of this position is the so-called dual pur­
pose card, which both designates the union as representative and 
states the signatory's desire for an election. The controversy has been 
particularly acute with respect to the solicitation of signatures on 
18. NLRB v. James Thompson & Co., 208 F.2d 743, 746 (2d Cir. 1953). 
19. E.g., Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 828-31 (1966). 
20. 62 L.R.R.M. at 1161 n.lO. 
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dual purpose cards with the representation that a purpose is to ob­
tain an election ; the Board has refused to invalidate such a card in 
the absence of a showing of a representation that an election was the 
only purpose sought to be achieved.21 
The foregoing, if I have apprehended it accurately and it has 
not been changed during its recounting, is the current state of Board 
law. Of the several issues raised by these doctrines, I would like to 
focus on three which seem to me central and controversial : proof of 
majority status through authorization cards, the relation of indepen­
dent unfair labor practices to the decision to issue a bargaining or­
der, and the asserted right of an employer to insist on an election 
m the first place.22 
I I. THE NEED TO PoLicE UsE OF AuTHORIZATION CARDS 
The Board has been needlessly rigid in its extreme reluctance to 
police union practices involving the collection of authorization 
cards. \Vhatever one concludes as to the broader issues discussed 
below, it must be recognized that the process of gathering and sub­
mitting cards is so unregulated, varying, and difficult to regularize 
that it presents serious possibilities of abuse. I sympathize strongly 
with the Board's apparent skepticism toward subsequent withdraw­
als and repudiations, witness-stand impeachment, and the like-al­
though I wish the Board would spell out a little more the nature 
and basis of its skepticism. However, it is another matter entirely 
for it to fail so completely even to attempt to regulate the content of 
cards and the conduct of union solicitors. The Board has upheld 
cards which on their face seem calculated to mislead. In S.N.C. JI..Ifg. 
Co.,23 the second line of the card-the only line of full capitals­
carried the statement, "I want an NLRB election now." There seems 
to me very little justification for failing to say squarely that, to es-
2!. See the discussion in Shelby Mfg. Co., 1 5 5  N.L.R.B. No. 39, 2 LAB. REL. REP. 
(GO L.R.R.M.) 1 346 (Nov. l, 1 965). For a decision in which cards were i n validated 
by the Board, see Family Bargain Cen ters, Inc., 1 60 ::--1 .L.R.B. No. 66, 2 L\B. REL. REP. 
(63 L.R.R.i\I.) 1 063 (Aug. 3 1 ,  1 966). 
22. This cataiogue excludes the much-disputed Ben1el Foam doctrine. One good 
discussion may be found in Comment, 1 1 3 U. PA. L. REv. 456 ( 1963). Berne! Foam 
has been unifonnly upheld by the courts of appeals, see N L RB v. Frank C. Varney 
Co., 359 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1966), and cases there cited, and in my judgment there is 
no substantial basis for dispute regarding its validity. Objections about giving the 
union "two bites at the apple" hardly seem to prove much; after all,  when the other 
fellow has put a worm i n  the apple, it  is hardly going very far to allow a second 
bite. (This i s  not to say that there is not a problem raised by the issuance of an 
order requiring an employer to recognize a union that has lost an election; see the 
last paragraph of note 64, infra). 
23.  1 47 N.L.R.B. 809 (1964), enforced sub nom. IUE v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 791 (D.C. 
Cir. 1 965). 
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tablish majority status, such a card may not be used at all; the loss 
to the union is minimal, and the safeguard against misunderstanding 
and misrepresentation is substantial. 
"Where the language of the cards is unambiguous, the Board, 
under its well-known Cumberland Shoe24 doctrine, will apparently 
not entertain any claim of misunderstanding on the employees' part 
and will find misrepresentation sufficient to vitiate a card only when 
the solicitor has said in so many words that its only purpose is the 
securing of an election. Here the gTound is slippery indeed, for we 
are dealing with statements made in litigation occurring months 
after the events. For example, the Sixth Circuit upheld the validity 
of the cards challenged in the Cumberland case, relying (quite prop­
erly in my view) on the fact that the employees' testimony was given 
in response "to leading questions propounded by [employer] coun­
sel, upon cross-examination, as to whether they were told that the 
purpose of the cards was to secure an election."25 Obviously, an 
affirmative answer to such a question does not establish real misrep­
resentation. Contrast, however, the practice upheld by the Board­
and by a majority of the Second Circuit over Judge Timbers' strong 
dissent-in Gotham Shoe,26 where several employees testified to 
being told such things as "they wanted to get enough signatures on 
the cards so that if they got a majority of signatures, they could have 
an election," "they needed a certain per cent of the employees to 
sign cards in order to get a vote," and "signing of the card was for 
the purpose of getting an election and was not itself a vote." Here, 
there is more than a suspicion that the employees in question were 
misled, whether deliberately or not. Yet the Board was content to 
note that the statements could be parsed consistently with the idea 
that one purpose of the cards was to secure bargaining rights.27 
Moreover, the Board seems almost never to go beyond invalidating 
a particular card, once it finds misrepresentation or coercion.23 As 
a general matter, this may be unobjectionable, but there are cer­
tainly some circumstances which call for a broader reaction. On 
some occasions, invalidation of all cards obtained by a particular so­
licitor, or obtained on a particular form of card, or secured follow­
ing a particular letter found to misrepresent the impact of the cards, 
2-1. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), enfoued, 351 F.2d 917 (6th 
Cir. 1965). 
25. Id. at 919, quoting from the Board opinion. 
26. NLRB v. Gotham Shoe i\ffg. Co., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1966). 
27. See also Mutual Indus., Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 62 L.R.KM. 1477 (June 21, 
1966) (organizer told employee that be needed a signed card in order to enter the 
plant to solicit other employees). 
28. See Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 710 (1961). 
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is warranted.20 More broadly, the Board should be less intent on a 
card-by-card adjudication of union guilt or innocence and more 
concerned with an overall evaluation of the atmosphere in which 
employees were asked to register their choice. The Board's function 
here is not unlike that which it discharges in ruling on challenges 
to an election, and its present stubbornness in dealing with cards 
only encourages broader disapproval and controversy. Surely methods 
are available to accommodate the Board's just concerns regarding 
the problems of litigating employees' understanding and intent 
with its obligation to discourage abuses of the system. 
I I I. THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 
ON THE IssuANCE OF A BARGAINING ORDER 
A. Employer Coercion as Proof of Bad Faith 
The Board has been most successful in the courts of appeals in 
winning approval of its fairly uniform practice of basing a finding 
of lack of good faith doubt on employer unfair labor practices 
committed during the organizational campaign. The finding is said 
to be one of fact-did the employer doubt the union's majority?­
and once the finding is made and upheld, the bargaining order can 
be routinely imposed and sustained as the obvious remedy for an 
unlawful refusal to bargain. While it may be wishful thinking to 
hope for the abandonment of a winning formula, it seems clear to 
me that the Board's rationale for its reliance on employer unfair 
labor practices should be discarded. The question is characteris­
tically put as whether the employer had a good faith doubt of the 
union's majority, or ·whether he rejected the collective bargaining 
principle and withheld Tecognition in order to gain time within 
which to undermine the union's majority.30 I must confess to a 
total inability to understand in what sense relevant here an em­
ployer is obliged to accept the collective bargaining principle. Of 
course he is enjoined to bargain in good faith (when he is obliged to 
bargain at all), and he must refrain from discrimination or coercion 
affecting employee attitudes toward collective bargaining. But what 
has that got to do with his state of mind or motivation ·when it 
comes to his response to an initial demand for recognition? It cer­
tainly cannot be unlawful for him to want to defeat the union at 
the polls and thereby obtain a lawful gTotmd for rejecting collective 
bargaining. If an employer is to be permitted, first, to insist on an 
29. E.g., Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v .  NLRB, 358 F.2d 755 (8th 
Cir. 1955). 
30. See, e.g., the quotation from Aaron Bros. in the text accompanying note 17 
supra. 
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election, and then to campaign against the union in that election, 
it is perfectly clear that he is being permitted to reject the collective 
bargaining principle so long as his employees do not, by voting for 
the union, oblige him to accept it. It simply encourages hypocrisy 
to permit an employer to acknowledge his doubts, but not his hopes. 
Similarly, the notion that an employer may not deny recognition 
"in order to gain time during which to undennine the union's 
majority" is an unfortunate one. If taken seriously, it would result 
in deeming it irrelevant whether the employer's opposition to union­
ization took lawful or unlawful form, and regarding as critical the 
question whether the employer was seeking to dissipate an existing 
majority or to prevent the union from obtaining one. Yet precisely 
the reverse situation seems to prevail. The Board has explicitly de­
clined to rely on lawful anti-union conduct as a gTound for inferring 
that an initial refusal to recognize was unlawful.31 But the taking 
of this step, unless no more than an obeisance to the language of 
section 8(c),32 implies that a legitimate purpose of the election is 
not simply to ascertain the validity of the union's initial claim to 
represent a majority, but also to test the durability of that majority 
in the crucible of a pre-election campaign. Once that fact is acknowl­
edged, it seems obvious that it is entirely irrelevant to the legitimacy 
of the employer's conduct whether the union initially commanded 
a majority, which it hoped to hold through a campaign, or began 
with something less than fifty per cent support, which it hoped to 
augment. 
B. The Bargaining Order as a Remedy 
As suggested above,33 I believe that the Board has recently begun 
to acknowledge that the rationale-and perhaps the scope as well­
of its reliance on unfair labor practices may be misplaced. First, 
recent decisions have emphasized the function of the bargaining 
order as one of remedy where employer interference has vitiated 
the reliability of the election as an indication of the uncoercecl 
wishes of the employees.34 Second, in a few cases-the Hammond 
& Irving decision35 is the best-known-the Board has declined, de-
3 1 .  Becker County Sand & Gravel Co., 157 N.L.R.B. Ko. 49, 6 1  L.R.R.M. 1407 
(i\larch 10, 1966). 
32. Section S(c) of the NLRA provides: 
The expressing of any views, . . or the dissemination thereof, . . shall not 
constitute or he evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression con· 
tains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 
61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S .C . § 15S(c) (196'1). 
33. See text accompanying note 20 supra. 
3,1. Sec the passage quoted from Aaron Bros. in the tr::,. accu,::pah1 .. Jg note 17 
supra. 
35. Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 :'\ .L.R.B. 1071 (I9G5) (intcrrJ:?a:\4��' gf Sixj �(r�e 
110 employees in unit). Sec also Clermont's, Inc . . Ed N.L.R.B. f397 (1955). • 
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spite the presence of unfair labor practices, to infer an unlawful 
motive for the original refusal to recognize. It has recently empha­
sized the flexibility of its application of the "good faith" test,36 a 
flexibility which would be entirely appropriate (and would seem less 
capricious) were the question deemed to be the remedial adequacy 
of a rerun election as distinguished from a bargaining order. The 
agency has been given wide discretion over choice of remedy, but 
on such a shift in rationale it would need to persuade the courts of 
appeals that the stronger remedy was not chosen routinely or sim­
ply as a deterrent,37 but was appropriate in light of the specific 
setting of the particular acts of illegality involved. This would be 
all to the good, in my view, for just such considerations ought to 
determine the result now. A parallel should be recognized to those 
cases in which a bargaining order is sought as a remedy for section 
S(a)(l )  or 8 (a)(3) violations alone; indeed, it should be acknowl­
edged that, where an election has been held, the question whether 
there was an earlier improper refusal to recognize is a totally ab­
stract one and should be irrelevant to the result.38 The Second Cir­
cuit's influential Flomatic decision illustrates how attention would 
be shifted from the meaningless issue of employer motivation and 
good faith to the central one of the nature and extent of his viola­
tions, and their impact on the employees.30 
In addition, both Board and courts would, one would hope, 
be encouraged to focus more fully on the problem of the rerun 
election and the importance of searching for imaginative means 
36. Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 6 2  L.R.R.M. 1160 (May 25, 1966). 
37. Local 60 , United Bhd. of Carpenters v. N L R B, 365 U.S. 651, 658 (1961) (Harlan, 
J., concurring); Republic Steel Corp. v. N L R B ,  311 U.S. 7, 1 2  (1940). 
38. See Priced- Less Discount Foods, Inc., 157 N. L. R. B. No. 95 , 61 L.R.R.M. 1505 
(l'dar. 28, 1966), and 77 Operating Co., 160 N.L. R. B. No. 68 , 2 LAB. REL. REP. (63 
L.R.R.M.) 1057 (Sept. 7, 1966), where the Board found it unnecessary to determine 
the substantive§ 8(a)(5) issue; Dayco Corp., 157 N. L.R.B. No. 117, 61 L.R.R.M. 1550 
(April 5, 1966), when'! the trial examiner, whose conclusions were adopted by the 
Board , treated interchangeably cases basing a bargaining order on a finding of a 
refusal to bargain and those ordering bargaining without such a finding; and Bishop 
& Malco , Inc., !59 N.L. R.B. No. 106, 62 L.R. R.M. 1498 (June 2·1, 1966),  where the 
Board, having found a violation of § 8(a)(5), went on to hold alternatively that a 
bargaining order would be wananted as a remedy even if it were determined that 
the employer had a bona fide doubt of the union's majority status. 
39. NL R B  v. F1omatic Corp., 347 F.2d 71 , 78 (2d Cir. 1965) , where the court 
reversed a post-election bargaining order to remedy a § S(a)(1) violation: 
[C]ard majorities must by necessity be deemed evidence of the status quo ante 
where the employer's conduct has been so flagrantly hostile to the organizing 
efforts of a union that a secret election has undoubtedly been corrupted as a 
result of the employer's milit�nt opposition. 
vyhere , as here , there was no such sustained broad-gauged campaign but only 
the mstance of a somewhat overstated reply to the union's charge, a bargaining 
order based on authorization Gtrcls in lieu of a secret election is less easily 
justified. 
But cf. the same court's decision in Irving Air Chute Co. v. NL R B, 350 F.2cl 176 (2d 
Cir. 1965), distinguishing Flomatic largely on the ground of Jack of a § S(a)(5) violation. 
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to ensure that the impact of employer violations is dissipated. The 
Board has taken a few steps in this direction, as in the well-known 
]. P. Stevens case,40 where the employer was required to mail copies 
of the Board notice to each of its employees in two states, to give 
the union reasonable access to company bulletin boards for the 
posting of its own notices, and to convene meetings of employees 
during working time, at which the Board notice ·would be reacl. 
Similarly, in H. W. Elson,41 the company was ordered to give union 
representatives the opportunity to address the employees on com­
pany time and property. By explicitly facing up to the question of 
the adequacy of a rerun election, and the possible development of 
means of enhancing its adequacy, the justification for a bargaining 
order in particular types of cases can be more soundly established, 
while in those cases where it is found not justified, the obligation 
to provide other means might perhaps be recognized and more fully 
met.42 
In speaking as I have, I have assumed that, in at least some 
cases, a bargaining order could be upheld as a remedy. That notion 
has been attacked, on the ground that it penalizes the employees as 
well as the employer and sacrifices the statutory rights of the former 
because of the other's disregard of the law.H Such views seem to 
me to be the product of an obsession with the infirmities of au­
thorization cards, and a romanticizing of the validity of an election. 
Cards have been used under the act for thirty years; the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that certification is not the only route to 
representative status;44 and the 1947 attempt in the House-passed 
Hartley Bill to amend section S(a)(S) to require employer recogni­
tion of certified unions only was rejected by the conference com­
mittee that produced the Taft-Hartley Act.45 No amount of drum­
beating should be permitted to overcome, without legislation, this 
40. J. P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 6 1  L.R.R.M. 1437 (March 22, 1966). 
4 1. H. W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 60 L.R.R.�I. 1381 (April 10, 
1965). 
42. It is probably not coincidental that Stevens and Elson were cases in which the 
Board thought itself precluded from issuing an order to bargain because the union 
had never achieved majority status. See also Scotts Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146, 62 
L.R.R.M. 1543 (June 30, 1966); Crystal Lake Broom Works, 159 :--.'.L.R.B. :--.'o. 30, 62 
L.R.R.M. 1407 (June 15, 1966). For an argument suggesting that a bargaining order 
may be appropriate in such a situation, see Bok, The Regulation of CamfJaign Tactics 
in Representation Elections Under the NLRA, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 13-1·39 ( 1964); 
cf. Note, 1 12 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 83 (1963). 
43. See, e.g., Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 839-44 ( 1966). 
•14. United i\Iine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 35 1 U.S. 62 ( 1956); BTOoks 
v. NLRB, 3·18 U.S. 96 ( 1954); Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944). 
45. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., lst Sess. 2 1, 8 1, § S(a)(5) (May 13, 1947) [I NLRB, 
LEGISL\TIVE HISTORY OF THE L�BOR ,\JANAGE:'>!ENT RELATIO;-;s :\CT, 19-!7, at 5 1  ( 19,18)] 
(the Hartley Bill); cf. 1-I.R. CoNF. REP. No. 5 10, 80th Cong., lst Sess. 4 1  (June 3, 19'17) 
(l NLRB LEGIS. I-liST. :H5). 
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history. As for the validity of elections, obviously the consistent 
affirmance of the appropriateness of compelling bargaining with an 
uncertified union bespeaks an awareness that elections too have some 
relevant infirmities. The problem is even more acute in the case of 
a rerun election made necessary by employer coercion or discrimina­
tion. It is important to bear in mind that an election is a far better 
cure for union than for employer m isdeeds.46 And the fact remains 
that, in a regime where there has been just concern over the ade­
quacy of the remedial scheme;17 the simple notion of doing over 
again what has worked badly once is hardly a reassuring method of 
undoing the effects of the abortive attempt. 
Nor can one responsibly invoke here the principle that inade­
quacies in one area of the Jaw should be treated directly, rather 
than by warping others-that two wrongs do not make a right. 
We are talking about a single concern: remedies when the election 
process has been corrupted through coercion or discrimination. 
vVhen the preferred method of determining employee wishes has 
been tampered with, it totally begs the question to say that em­
ployee rights are sacrificed by a bargaining order. Employee rights 
are affected whatever the result : If an inadequate rerun remedy is  
routinely applied, the rights of those employees who desire collec­
tive bargaining, and whose desires were met with violations of law, 
are not being protected; if a bargaining order is issued, the rights 
of those who oppose collective bargaining are being tramped on i f  
-and I emphasize the "if"-a poll conducted after the effects of 
earlier coercion were satisfactorily dissipated 1voul d  indicate a union 
loss. Thus it is impossible to defend a refusal to impose a bargain­
ing order unless one is willing to defend the adequacy of the par­
ticular remedies in fact applied in connection with the decision to 
direct a second election. Perhaps, if the time comes when the Board 
has developed practical and workable rules regulating rerun el ec­
tions, and they have been upheld by the courts, and are appl i ed 
i n  more than the exceptional case, it will  be appropriate to say that 
46. Since the union's continued i n fluence over the job and fate o f  the empl oyees 
is largely contingent on its prevailing at the polls, an employee can ordina r i ly shake 
free of its power by voting "no." (He will usually fmd the isolation and anonymitv 
of the polling booth sufficient to insul:lte him from union-generated prior pressures). 
A "yes" vote, however, does not act as a s imilar insulator against empl oyer pressures; 
the employee is not voting for or against continuing his association "·ith the em ­
ployer, and the latter's displeasure at the ou tcome of the vote will he a m a tter of 
continuing concern to the employee. 
47. See, e.g., SUlJCOM.V!ITTEE ON l\'LRB, HOUSE CO�Ioi !TTEE ON EDUCATION A:-<D LABOR 
87th Cong. , lst Sess., A dministmtion of the Labor-Managem e n t  Relations ;/ct by t h e  
NLRB 20-2'1 ( 1 961) (The Pucinski report) ; Bok, supra note 4 2 ,  a t  6-l-65 . 1 2-l-25 : Note, 
The Need for CTea t ive Orders Under Section J O(c) of til e XLR.1 , 1 12 U.  l'A. L. REI'. 
69 ( 1963) . 
----���-�-��------------------------------------����-� 
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barga m mg orders should not be used as a remedy. It seems plain 
that that time is not the present. Indeed, it would not be surprising 
if it were the use of the bargaining order which prompted the 
development of other remedies. It is not uncommon in legal regu­
lation for those who have been unwilling to take even a single sub­
stantial step to agree to do so once others begin to insist on taking 
two. 
IV. THE AssERTED EMPLOYER RrcHT TO AN ELECTION 
It is appropriate to face last the problem which raises the most 
fundamental and controversial questions of underlying policy, al­
though-because of the prevalence of employer unfair labor prac­
tices during an organizing campaign-its practical importance may 
be substantially less. I refer of course to the right of an employer 
faced with a demand for recognition to insist on an election in the 
first pl ace. I have suggested earlier that the Labor Board, after giv­
ing some indication of a rejection of any such general right, has re­
cently taken the view (or one which is in practice its near equivalent) 
that an employer may insist on an election.48 This position is favored 
by nearly everyone who has spoken to the question,4n and it 
can only be some deep-seated perversity that impels me to swim 
against so strong a current. Since I am about to do so, however, I 
should be careful not to over-state my position. I am not so much 
convinced that an employer should not be permitted to insist on 
an election as I am wholly unconvinced by the arguments that I 
have seen or read in support of such a right. Do I fairly summarize 
the case for an employer's right to an election in these terms? \Vhat-
48. The cases discussed above (see notes 9- 1 5  supra and accompanying text) sug­
gest that a n  employer who meets a union demand for recogn ition w i t h  a laconic  
expression of scorn for authorization cards will  not be held to have lacked a good­
faith doubt. Hence, I say that he may insist on an election . H &: IV Constr. Co., 1 6 1  
N.L.R.B .  :\o. 77,  2 LAB. REL. REP. (63 L.R.R.M.) 1 3-!6 (Nov. 1 3 ,  1 966) the most recen t  
decision, warns the garrulous a n d  t h e  unwary that i t  is  only t h e  assertion of a 
doubt regarding present majority, protected as it is by the lack of any requirement 
of objective substantiatio n .  that confers this immuni ty. Apparently, an employer 
may not "waive" this doubt, and rely instead on a faith or hope that em p loyees 
conceded to be presently in favor of unionization will (through lawful means) come 
to vote against it. Sec l\-Iernber 7.agoria's dissent in H. & W., 2 L\ll. Ru .. REP. (63 
L.R.R.M.) a t  1 3,19-50. (Perhaps the Board will construe H. & W. more narrowly, and 
hold that an employer may rely as well on this latter variety of doubt, provided h e  
voices it  in response t o  t h e  union demand. Such a proviso would have little appeal, 
but i t  seems more troublesome yet to draw a line permitting a n  e mployer to obtain 
a future secret vote i f  h e  thinks a present secret vote would con tradict a present 
card-check but not i f  he thinks that only a future secret vote would have that effect.) 
49. See 1 1 1  CoNG . Rrc. 1 9308 (daily ed. Aug. 'l, 1 965) (Senator Javits) ; 1 1 1  Co:-.:c . 
Rrc. 1 5 124 (daily ell. J u n e  29, 1 965) (Senator Fannin); SouTHWESTER:-.: Lrr.AL Fou;-.;n.\­
TION, L\BOR L\W DnELOI'\IEC.:TS 2GO ( 1 965) (Prof. Bok) . If I read the vic\\·s of  Secre­
tary of Labor Wirtz correctly, perhaps I can claim him as partial support for what 
follows. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 1 9-26 (especially p .  25). 
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history. As for the validity o f  elections, obviously the consistent 
affirmance of the appropriateness of compel ling bargaining with an 
uncertified union bespeaks an awareness that elections too have some 
relevant infirmities. The problem is even more acute in the case of 
a rerun election made necessary by employer coercion or discrimina­
tion. It  is importan t  to bear in mind that an election is  a far better 
cure for union than for employer misdeeds.46 And the fact remains 
that, i n  a regime where there has been j ust concern over the ade­
quacy of the remedial scheme,47 the simple notion of doing over 
again what has worked badly once is hardly a reassuring method of 
undoing the effects of the abortive attempt. 
Nor can one responsibly invoke here the principle that i nade­
quacies in one area of the law should be treated directly, rather 
than by warping others-that two wrongs do not make a right. 
We are talking about a single concern : remedies when the election 
process has been corrupted through coercion or discrimination. 
When the preferred method of determining employee wishes has 
been tampered with, it totally begs the question to say that em­
ployee rights are sacrificed by a bargaining order. Employee rights 
are affected whatever the result :  If an inadequate rerun remedy is  
routinely applied, the rights of those employees who desire col1ec­
tive bargaining, and whose desires were met with v iolations of law, 
are not being protected; if a bargaining order is  issued, the rights 
of those 'vho oppose collective bargaining are being tramped on i f  
-and I emphasize the "if"-a poll conducted a fter the effects o f  
earlier coercion were satisfactorily dissipated would indicate a union 
loss. Thus i t  is impossible to defend a refusal to impose a bargain­
ing order unless one is willing to defend the adequacy of the par­
ticular remedies in fact applied in connection with the decision to 
direct a second election. Perhaps, i f  the time comes when the Board 
has developed practical and workable rules regulating rerun elec­
tions, and they have been upheld by the courts, and are <�ppliecl 
in more than the exceptional case, it will be approp,·iate to s:1y that 
46. S ince the union's continued influence over the job and fate of t h e  em ployccs 
i s  largely contingent on i ts prevail ing at the polls, an employee can o rdinari ly  shake 
free o f  its power by voting "no." (He will  usually find t h e  isolation and anonymitY 
o f  the poll ing booth sufficient to insulate h i m  from u n ion-generated p rior pressures). 
A "yes" vote, however, does not act as a similar insulator again s t  employer press u res; 
the e m p loyee is not voting for or against continuing his association '"i t h  the em­
ployer, and the latter's displeasure a t  the outcome of the Hltc will  be a matter of 
con tinuing concern to the employee. 
47. Sec. e.g., Sunco�Dl lrrEE ON N LRB, HousE Co:>.IM ITTEE ON l:Dt.:C.·\T!O:\ A:\D LABOR 
87th Cong., 1st  Scss., A dministmtion of the Labor-Manage111 ent  Relations Act by the 
NLRB 20-2-1 ( lO G ! )  (The Pucinsk i  report); Bok, sujna note ·t2 ,  a t  6·1 - G :J .  1 '2-1-25 ; 1\'ote,  
The Need for Crea tive Orders Under Section J O(c) of the NLJU , 1 1 2 l ' .  1' .·\ . L. REv. 
69 (1963) .  
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bargaining orders should not be used as a remedy. It seems plain 
that that time is not the present. Indeed, it would not be surprising 
if it were the use of the bargaining order which prompted the 
development of other remedies. It is not uncommon in legal regu­
lation for those who have been unwilling to take even a single sub­
stantial step to agree to do so once others begin to insist on taking 
rwo. 
IV. THE AssERTED EMPLOYER RIGHT To AN ELECTION 
It is appropriate to face last the problem which raises the most 
fundamental and controversial questions of underlying policy, al­
though-because of the prevalence of employer unfair labor prac­
tices during an organizing campaign-its practical importance may 
be substantially less. I refer of course to the right of an employer 
faced with a demand for recognition to insist on an election in the 
first place. I have suggested earlier that the Labor Board, after giv­
ing some indication of a rejection of any such general right, has re­
cently taken the view (or one which is in practice its near equivalent) 
that an employer may insist on an election.48 This position is favored 
by nearly everyone who has spoken to the question,49 and it 
can only be some deep-seated perversity that impels me to swim 
against so strong a current. Since I am about to do so, however, I 
should be careful not to over-state my position. I am not so much 
convinced that an employer should not  be permitted to insist on 
an election as I am wholly unconvinced by the arguments that I 
have seen or read in support of such a right. Do I fairly summarize 
the case for an employer's right to an election in these terms? ·what-
48. The cases discussed above (see notes 9-15 sujJra and accompanying text) sug­
gest that an employer who meets a union demand for recognition with a laconic 
expression of scorn for authmization cards will not be held to have lacked a good­
faith doubt. Hence, I say that he may insist on an election. H & \V Constr. Co., 1 6 1  
N .L.R.B. l'<o. 77, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (63 L.R.R.M.) 1 3-!6 (Nov. 13, 1 966) the most recent 
decision, warns the garrulous and the unwary that it is only the assertion of a 
doubt regarding present majority, protected as it is by the lack of any requirement 
of objective substantiation, that confers this immunity. Apparently, an employer 
may not "waive" this doubt, ant! rely instead on a faith or hope that employees 
conceded to be presently in fa, or of unionization wil l  (through lawful means) come 
to vote against it. See Member Zagoria's dissent in H. & W., 2 L;.n. Ru .. REP. (63 
L.R.R.M.) at 1 3-!9-50. (Perhaps the Board will construe H. & W. more narrowly, and 
hold that an employer may rely as well on this latter variety of doubt, provided he 
voices it in response to the union demand. Such a proviso would have little appeal ,  
but  it seems more troublesome yet  to draw a line permitting an employer to obtain 
a future secret vote if he thinks a present secret vote would contradict a presen t 
cant-check but not if he thinks that only a future secret vote would h ave that effect.) 
49. See I l l  Co:--:c. REc. 1 9308 (daily ctl. Aug. 4, 1 965) (Senator Jal'its) ; 1 1 1  Co:--:c.  
REC. 1 5 1 24 (daily eeL June 29, 1 965) (Senator fannin); SOUTHWESTER]'; LEG.-\L FOU:'>:DA· 
TION, L\BOR LAW DEVEL.OP:. rnas 260 ( 1 965) (Prof. Bok). l f  I read the vic1,·s of Secre­
tary of Labor 'Virtz correctly, perhaps I can claim him as partial support fur what 
follows. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 19-26 (especiaUy p. 25). 
. ._ 
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ever the situation earlier, since 1947 it  has not been the policy of 
the National Labor Relations Act to foster and promote union or­
ganization, and the Labor Board goes beyond its authority when it 
seeks, as it has been accused of doing, to "force people into unions." 
Even if  one were to acknowledge that authorization cards were 
"validly" obtained, in the sense that an election held on the very 
day of a demand for recognition would produce a un ion majority­
an acknowledgement that would not be routinely warranted-there 
is an interest in withholding the polling of employees until 
there has been a campaign. First of all, the choice of a bargaining 
representative is a sufficiently weighty decision that it  should b e  
made with some ceremony.5° Cards can be collected one at a time, 
in small groups, or at  a meeting, as best suits the tactics of the or­
ganizer. There is no assurance that an employee, even if he freely 
believes at the moment that he wishes to have the un ion represent 
him, "really" has made a measured decision. The trappings of the 
secret ballot election-government personnel, ballot boxes, and so 
forth-serve in part to impress upon the employee that he is not 
simply picking Miss Rheingold of 1967 . Beyond that, the employees, 
solicited in whatever manner best suits the union, do not ordinarily 
have the opportunity to consider, or even be informed about, pos­
sible disadvantages to them of collective bargaining or of repre­
sentation by the particular union involved. The employer, because 
of financial and other interests in opposing unionization, serves a 
public function in bringing relevant considerations to the em­
ployees' ears. Thus, employee sentiment registered after a campaign 
more truly reflects their free choice than does an affirmative re­
sponse to what has been called "instant unionism" through the 
solicitation of cards. 51 
I must confess that the foregoing reasoning-or any alternative 
formulation I have seen-leaves me largely unpersuacled.52 It seems 
50. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's excellent discussion of  the ratirmale of the "certifi­
cation bar" in Brooks v. NLRB, 3·18 U.S. 96, 99- 1 00 ( 1954) . 
5 ! .  Compare the somewhat similar argument in favor o f  permitting a minority 
union to picket prior to an election:  "Insistence upon an election [prior to enjoining 
picketing] is  a matter of jurisdictional propriety in the sense that . . .  an election 
is  much the most reliable test of employee sentiment, but it also goes to the meaning 
of  freedom of choice." Cox, Some Cunen t Problems in Labor Law: An A ppraisal, 
35 L.R.R.i\L 48, 56 ( 1954). 
52. I think it clear that the rationale underlying the Board's current view is not 
that summarized i n  the preceding paragraph of the text. The uncertain scope 
of  H. & W. Construction,  see note 48 supra, makes precision difficult, but the 
Board is apparently reluctan t  to accept the notion that a campaign is a desirable pre­
lude to an expression of employee choice. It rather seems concerned with the purity o f  
heart of  the employer: Was h e  honestly uncertain where his duty lay? Considering the 
elusiveness of the many relevant factual issues and the controvcrsiality of the concept 
of "uncoerced majority," tha t concern seems the least weighty. One is not branded 
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to me to rest on a serious misstatement of the attitude of the statute 
toward the spread of collective bargai ning and on an inappropriate 
romanticizing about employee free choice and its relevance to what 
actually goes on when employees are asked to vote for or against 
unionization. 
As to the first-a matter which is or ought to be of the deepest 
political controversy-it is simply not so that prior to 194 7 the act 
sought to encourage collective bargain ing but that it does so no 
more. All that happened in 1947 was that Congress gave recognition 
to two competing values: the interests of employees in rejecting 
collective bargaining, and of employers in opposing unionization 
through noncoercive speech. Surely no lawyer would suggest that a 
legislature must choose between supporting a principle, whatever 
the cost, and rejecting it entirely. ·were any such notion to be taken 
seriously, Congress would never have passed a single piece of labor 
legislation. Even the vVagner Act contained an implicit limitation 
on the desire to foster collective bargaining, in the form of the 
principles of majority rule and e1ections.53 In 1947, the interest in  
refraining from concerted activities was raised to the status of  a 
legal right, as against certain forms of union restraint and coercion. 
In addition, recognition was given to the employer's interest in  seek­
ing, through speech, to influence the employees' choice. None of 
this can be used to gainsay the fact that the encouragement of col­
lective bargaining remains one goal of this complex, multi-contra­
dictory statute.54 While Congress amended the statute's statement 
of findings and policies, it continues to be the declared national 
policy "to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions 
to the free flow of commerce . . .  by encouraging the practice and 
procedure of collective bargaining . . . .  "55 Obviously, many people 
a criminal, nor apparently is h e  disgraced, by being adjudged a violator o f  § S(a)(5), 
and the relief is prospective only (except in those cases i n  which replaced strikers 
wl10 have unsuccessfully resorted to self-help in support of a recogn i tion demand 
seek back-pay as u n fa i r  labor practice strikers, and there the employees have most con­
vincingly demonstrated their adherence to unionization). I t  seems clear to m e  that 
the scope o f  permitted employer insistence on an election should be either broader 
or narrower than it now appears to be. 
53. Cf. Fur Workers Union (CIO) v. Fur ·workers Union (AFL), 1 05 F.2d I (D.C. 
Cir. ! 939),  af}'d fJer cmiam, 308 U.S. 522 (1 930); COX, LAW AND THE i\IATJOiiAL LABOR 
POLICY 23 ( 1 960). 
54. The continued recognition given to the i n terest of unions i n  expanding orga n i ­
zation is evidenced bv t h e  Curtis Bros. decision, N L R B  v .  Drivers L o c a l  6 3 9 ,  3 6 2  U.S.  
27-1 ( 1 960), and, ind�ecl, by the m u l tiple ambivalences of the more-recently enacted 
§ S(b)(7) . 
55.  N LRA § I ,  as amended, 6 1  Stat.  1 36 ( 1 947), 29 U.S.C. § 1 5 1  ( 1 %4). Note that 
this aim is stated as an additional objective to that o f  "protecting the exercise by 
workers o f  full  freedom o f  association . . . .  " Note also the congressional espousal of  
the aim of "stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions . . . .  " 
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today-perhaps a majority-do not believe that our national labor 
policy should encourage collective bargaining, to whatever degree. 
I am not seeking to argue that question here; I am asserting that 
such a policy was central to the statute as originally enacted, and 
that it remains in the act today, resting alongside competing prin­
ci pies. 
In speaking of the election process as an enhancement of em­
ployee free choice, we must all recognize the danger of arguing from 
a model which cannot be universally valid and may not even be 
typical. For example, employees may not know that a particular 
union sets gTeat store by area-wide uniformity of standards, and 
that in designating it as their representative they may be subordi­
nating their own interests to those of employees i n  the i ndustry 
as a whole. Or-to choose another example-employees may not 
know of unsavory practices carried on by leaders of the local or 
international union, or of particular political or other public aims 
espoused or financed by the union. In cases such as these, it may 
be appropriate to see i n  an election campaign a contribution to 
a better-informed free choice.5G However, even if an election is a 
requisite to the disclosure of such information,57 I •vonder what per­
centage of the cases potentially coming before the Board can be 
said to fit this model. After all, the safeguarding of employee free 
choice (l ike the promotion of collective bargaining) has not always 
been a decisive factor in the definition of permissible campaign 
practices, and it seems to me dangerously m isleading to equate 
what is l awful campaigning w ith what promotes employee free 
choice. The probl em is only in part that of coping with delay, veiled 
threats, subtle coercion and the like, or of section S(c) or its interpre­
tation.58 The more fundamental point is that employees do not make 
choices about unionization for the same reasons, or in the same con-
56. B u t  cf. Bok, supra lcOW 42, at 88-89, suggesting grounds for doubting the influ­
ence of such facwrs on the employees. 
57. This assump tion is cmirdy true only where there is almost litera l l y  a case of 
"insta n t  unionization . "  \Vhcre the employer has a pre-demand awareness o f  an orga­
nizing effort, his decision to delay announcement of i nformation damaging to the 
union until  a petition is filed is a tactical choice. 
58. For reliance on facwrs l i ke these to oppose the right to i nsist on a n  election.  
see Cox, LAW A N D  THE �.HIONAL LABOR POLICY 4 1 -·12 ( 1 950); SOUTHWF.STF.Rr\ LEGAL 
FoUNDATION, L\BOR LAw DEVELOPMENTS 270 -75 ( 1 965). Recent improvements in the 
processing of representation proceedings, and more Testrictive Tegulation of employer 
speech, see Bok, S ltjna note 42, tend to al leviate these factors somewhat. Might the 
Board not consider, if an employer opportuni ty to campaign is  thought desirable, 
acknowledging a righ t to insist o n  a n  election provided certa i n  cond i tions were met, 
e.g., a n  employer petition , agreement o n  a prompt election, consen t to Teasonablc 
rcstrictio1's on the vol u m e  and content o f  campaign propaganda, prompt adjudica­
tion o f  challenges to disciplinary action? Our traditional hostility to Board l a w-makina 
(whether by rule or decision) i nhibits s u ch developments, and makes more difEcul� 
a sensitive resolu tion of difficu l t  issues. 
l\farch 1967] Bargaining Rights 867 
text, that they join veterans' organizations, political parties, churches, 
or bowling leagues. If they are supporting collective bargaining in an 
attempt to exert increased economic pressure against their em­
ployer, he might influence their decision by arguing-this is called 
"pointing out the disavantages" of organization-that such pressure 
will be ineffectual or self-defeating, or will be met by counter-pres­
sures which migh t leave the employees worse off than before. I am 
thinking, obviously, of the employer's right under the law to refuse 
to make concessions, to take a strike, to lock out, and to subject 
strikers to the risk of permanent loss of their jobs to replacements. 
The fact is that we have a dual regime in our labor law: We attempt 
to insulate employees from economic pressure affecting their deci­
sion whether or not to bargain collectively, but we build our scheme 
of collective bargaining on the foundation of economic power.50 
The governing principle, to adapt Professor Cox's happy aphorism 
to this context, is: "To the lion belongs the lion's share."60 We 
delude ourselves, however, when we begin to think of these com· 
partments as watertight, and the election campaign is the spot at  
which the point of leakage is to be found. The lawful coercion of 
collective bargaining must affect the intended free choice of the 
voters in a Labor Board election. 
Again, understand that I am not questioning our concept of 
collective bargaining as one of economic warfare, nor even denying 
the implications of that fact for the lawfulness of employer "predic­
tions" in organizing campaigns. But a "free" choice connotes one 
protected from coercive pressures, not merely one fully informed 
of them, and i t  makes a mockery of the notion of free choice to in­
voke it as the interest which clamors for expression via an employer 
anti-union campaign. Perhaps our national labor policy should af­
ford employers an opportunity to persuade their employees to aban­
don an earlier preference for collective bargaining.61 But such a 
view must find i ts justification in the strength of the interests of the 
employer h imsel£,62 or in a felt need to protect employees from the 
59.  Sec American Ship B u ilding Co. v. N LRB, 380 U .S .  300 ( 1 965) ; NLRB v. 
I nsurance Agents' Int'l U n ion , 361  U.S. 4 i 7  (1 900); :-o:LRB v. American Nat'!  Ins. Co., 
3·13 u.s.  395 ( 1 952).  
60.  Cox. The Duty of Fair Represen tation ,  2 Vru . .  L. REV. 1 5 1 ,  1 6 3  ( 1 9:'>7). 
6 1 . \Vhen I speak of such a n  "earlier preference," I assume that the rules regulat­
ing the gathering of authorization cards arc the product (as they n o w  are not ,  see 
tex t accompanying no tes 23-29 Sll/Jm) of a sustained and discriminating efTort to kccp 
abuses an d inadequacies within acceptable  limits.  I f  this condition is met, em ployees 
a re not being • · forced i n to unions." 
62. Cf. Secretary ·wirtz's  views , i n  Hea rings, supra n o te 2 ,  :H 25. The argument that 
§ S(c) guara n tees an employer a n  oppon u n ity to campa ign p rior to being compelled 
w bargain w i t h  a union is one conten t ion w h ich cou l d  be made w i t h i n  t h is frame­
\,·ork. The argument that the 0i LRA is e n tirely ind ifferen t  to the s p read o f  u nion iza-
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hazards of letting their militancy outrun their power.63 It should 
not be permitted to wrap itself in the attractive mantle of our tra­
ditional desire to protect and nurture associational self-determina­
tion.64 
tion, and that, therefore, in fairness each side should have its turn to play the game, 
is another. 
63. Cf. Bok, supra note 42, at 74-82: "[T]he employer should be permitted to 
stress . . .  disadvantages [of unionization] so long as the consequences he mentions are 
ones which may actually and lawfully take place if  the union is voted in." Id. at 79, 
discussing rules regulating election propaganda. 
64. I will do no more than sketch in a concluding footnote my present thoughts 
regarding the balance of advantage which the foregoing considerations seem to me to 
produce, for they are tentatiYe and rest on assertions one does not often see or hear pub-
licly debated. The interests suggested in  note 62 seem to me unsupported by the statute 
as enacted. (On § S(c), I rely on its language and the failure to amend §§ 8(a)(5) and 
9(a), see note 45 supra and accompanying text; I think a constitutional objection 
cannot be seriously maintained, in part for reasons suggested by note 57 s!lpra). As 
a matter of equity-and it must be conceded that political-economic preferences are 
a large ingredient of  one's response to this issue-! am not persuaded that an em- , player is being treated unfairly if he is denied a general right to a post-demand ' 
election campaign. The consideration refened to in the text accompanying note 63 i 
(protecting employees from improvident militancy) is more troublesome, and deserves f 
the fullest exploration. My present inclination to discount it renects in part the feeling � 
that there may be an aspect of the self-fulfilling prophecy in rules motivated by a 
desire to be sure that employees realize their vulnerability; in part it reflects exas­
peration at a public policy that seems to have lost the capacity even to ask whether 
lessened vulnerability might be an altern ative solution to heightened awareness. 
These views, more fully spelled out, better supported, and not persuasively rebut­
ted, would lead one to espouse a rule permitting an employer faced with a demand 
for recognition based on a proper showing, see note 61  supra, of cards to withhold 
recognition only on the basis of  a specific and objectively reasonable basis for doubt­
ing the validity of the showing, much as in the case of an employer refusal to renego­
tiate an expiring contract, e.g., Laystrom Mfg. Co., 1 5 1  N.L.R.B. 1482 ( 1 965). (The 
General Counsel would of course have to prove union majority status, unsupported 
by any presumption). The lloard explicitly rejected such a rule, reversing the trial 
examiner, in  I-I. & W. Constr. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (63 L.R.R.M.) 
1 3,16 (Nov. 1 3 ,  1966). But cf. the court of appeals' formulation i n  Snow & Sons, 1 34 
N .L.R.B. 709 ( 1 961),  enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1 962). 
I should add that such a view is not, in my judgment, inconsistent with a refusal 
to issue a post-election bargaining order except as a remedy, see note 38 supra and 
accompanying text. ·whatever the initial availability of unfair labor practice proceed­
ings, if a union has chosen to go through an election, and has lost it, the case is differ­
ent. To say that the election was invalid is not to say that it never occurred, nor that 
the union should be deemed to have representative status. The question is whether 
a new poll is or is not a preferable way of now resolving the question. EYen if  one 
were to say that the election was tainted ab initio, as it were, by being made necessary 
only by an unlawful refusal to bargain, it is not, I think, a return to A iello, see note 
16 supra, to deem it of significance that a petition was filed, and that the employees 
were polled and voted to reject the union. The consequence is not to say that the 
§ 8(a)(5) charge is "waived"; i t  is to say that it does not effectuate the policies of the 
act to issue a b:ugaining order unless, in light of  all that happened, i t  is appropriate 
as a remedy. 
